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“Enemy-Controlled Battlespace”: 
The Contemporary Meaning and 
Purpose of Additional Protocol I’s 
Article 44(3) Exception 
 
 
Kubo Mačák* and Michael N. Schmitt** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The contemporary propensity for, and risk of, armed conflict taking 
place  among  the  civilian  population  has  cast  a  new  light  on  several 
long-standing challenges to the application of international 
humanitarian law (IHL). One is the determination of combatant status 
and,  more  specifically,  the  question  of  when  the  requirement  for  the 
combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population may 
exceptionally  be  relaxed.  In  addressing  this  question,  the  Article  re-
examines Additional Protocol I’s Article 44(3) and adopts an 
interpretation thereof that better comports with its object and purpose 
than those previously prevalent. After exposing the limitations of relying 
solely on drafting history to understand the provision’s exception, the 
object  and  purpose  of  Article  44(3)  are  assessed.  On  that  basis,  the 
authors proffer “enemy control of battlespace” as the appropriate 
standard  for  determining  situations  to  which  the  exception  applies. 
Finally, they highlight a number of legal safeguards that promote the 
protection of the civilian population whenever the exception is 
applicable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The  notion  of  combatancy  lies  at  the  heart  of  international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Parties to an armed conflict are obligated by 
customary  and  treaty  law  to  distinguish  between  combatants  and 
civilians  and  direct  their  operations  only  against  the  former,  except 
when civilians have lost their protection from attack through 
membership in an organized armed group or by directly participating 
in hostilities.1 Combatancy also accords rights and entitlements. 
During an international armed conflict, combatants enjoy immunity 
from  prosecution  in  both  domestic  and  international  tribunals  for 
activities related to the hostilities that are lawful under IHL, 2 most 
notably intentionally killing the enemy and, in some situations, 
launching  an  attack  that  is  certain  to  incidentally  harm  civilians. 
Additionally, combatants are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status, 
and the many protections that attach thereto, upon capture.3  
 While these basic obligations and rights are universally accepted, 
the precise criteria for qualification as a combatant lack clarity. This 
Article zeroes in on the meaning of a single criterion resident in Article 
                                                                                                                  
 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter. Previous versions of this article were 
presented at the “War in Cities and the Law of Armed Conflict” Conference at Brigham 
Young  University  Law  School  in  February  2018  and  at  the  “Responding  to  Hybrid 
Threats  by  Force:  International  and  National  Law  Aspects”  Conference  at  Palacký 
University  in  the  Czech  Republic  in  May  2018.  In  addition  to  the  helpful  feedback 
received  from  participants  in  those  conferences,  we  would  like  to  acknowledge  with 
gratitude the insightful comments on drafts by Dr. Ana Beduschi, Dr. Russell Buchan, 
Prof. Geoffrey Corn, Gp. Capt. Ian Henderson, Dr. Aurel Sari, and Dr. Noam Zamir. Any 
errors or omissions are our sole responsibility. 
 
** Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Howard S. Levie Professor, 
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1. Protocol  Additional  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  1949,  and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51 (2) & 
(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see 
also 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW rr. 1, 6 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CIHL STUDY]; INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE  ON  THE NOTION  OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION  IN 
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 27–36, 46 (2009); MICHAEL N. 
SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT r. 1.1.2 (Int’l Inst. of Humanitarian Law 2006). 
2. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2). 
3. Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 
4A, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] 
(defining prisoners of war); Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(1). 
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44(3) of Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
The text of the provision is as follows: 
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of 
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population  while  they  are  engaged  in  an  attack  or  in  a  military  operation 
preparatory  to  an  attack.  Recognizing,  however,  that  there  are  situations  in 
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided 
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:  
(a) During each military engagement, and  
(b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a 
military  deployment  preceding  the  launching  of  an  attack  in  which  he  is  to 
participate.  
Acts  which  comply  with  the  requirements  of  this  paragraph  shall  not  be 
considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c). 4 
 The second sentence of Article 44(3) is noteworthy because it offers 
combatants exceptional relief from the general obligation to 
distinguish themselves. Whether the exception is militarily sensible is 
the  subject  of  heated  and  long-standing  disagreement,  with  certain 
nonparty states, most notably the United States and Israel, citing the 
provision  as,  in  part,  their  basis  for  refusal  to  ratify  the  treaty.5 
Although we address the underlying logic of the competing positions in 
passing,  it  is  not  our  purpose  here  to  relitigate  this  controversy. 
Rather, our objective is more focused—to elucidate the meaning of the 
determinative phrase “cannot so distinguish” in the context of 
contemporary conflict. 
 Our exploration of the functioning of Article 44(3) is apposite for a 
number  of  reasons.  Firstly,  the  number  of  states  parties  to  AP  I  is 
                                                                                                                  
 
4. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3). 
5. See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 
Geneva,  Switz.,  1974–1977,  vol.  VI,  Summary  Records  of  the  Fourth  Session  Plenary 
Meetings,  at  121  ¶  17  (Fed.  Pol.  Dep’t  Bern,  1978)  [hereinafter  Official  Records] 
(explaining Israel’s vote against the draft rule on grounds that it “was contrary to the 
spirit and to a fundamental principle of humanitarian law”); Message from President 
Ronald Reagan Transmitting Additional Protocol II to the Senate, 100th Cong., Treaty 
Doc.  100-2  (Jan.  29,  1987)  (“Another  provision  [of  Additional  Protocol  I]  would  grant 
combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional 
requirements  to  distinguish  themselves  from  the  civilian  population  and  otherwise 
comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and 
other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves.”); see also U.S.  DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL 119, ¶ 4.6.1.2 (2016) [hereinafter D OD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] (noting the 
United States’ objections “to the way [Additional Protocol I] relaxed the requirements for 
obtaining the privileges of combatant status”). 
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slowly but steadily increasing.6 As such, the application of its 
provisions is statistically likely to be more frequent in the future. This 
is of particular importance with respect to those provisions that, like 
the  rule  in  question,  arguably  do  not  already  amount  to  customary 
international law that is binding on all states.7  
 Secondly, the relevance of Article 44(3)’s exception to the 
requirement of distinction is on the rise due to the evolving nature of 
warfare. Since the 1970s, decolonization and proxy wars, which were 
the staple of Cold War-era armed conflict, have been replaced in great 
part,  albeit  not  entirely,  by  asymmetrical  conflicts  pitting  military 
superpowers like the United States and its partners against 
significantly  weaker  forces  and  localized  armed  groups  with  limited 
resources and military strength, as was the case in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq.8 During such insurgencies or other modes of asymmetrical 
warfare, the forces of the weaker party are often based in, and conduct 
hostilities among, the civilian population. The exception ameliorates 
the  difficulty  of  effectively  fighting  an  asymmetrically  advantaged 
opponent in such circumstances by countenancing the suspension of 
the obligation to distinguish oneself when the conditions of the 
provision are met.  
 Urbanization will exacerbate the phenomenon of war among the 
civilian population. While in 1974 only 1.5 billion people lived in cities, 
the corresponding figure for 2018 is estimated at 4.2 billion—nearly a 
threefold increase.9 To place the trend in context, by the middle of this 
century, almost 70 percent of the global population will live in cities.10 
In that war usually follows people, the flight to cities has brought with 
it a growing incidence of urban warfare. 11 Crucially, asymmetrically 
weaker  opponents  will  often  find  it  strategically  and  operationally 
advantageous to exploit the urban environment in order to maintain a 
realistic prospect of victory over their militarily more powerful 
                                                                                                                  
 
6. See States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other 
Related Treaties, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (June 4, 2018), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl [https://perma.cc/93UJ-Y5HB] (archived Sept. 10, 2018). 
7. For the customary status of Article 44 of Additional Protocol I, see infra text 
accompanying notes 21–24. 
8. See generally MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS (2d ed. 2007) (analyzing the 
patterns of war and violence and comparing recent wars with those in the past).  
9. UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 
2018 REVISION—KEY FACTS 2, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/ [https://perma.cc/C7JT-
NJXF] (archived Sept. 10, 2018). 
10. UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 
2014 REVISION—HIGHLIGHTS 7, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/wup2014 
-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/93C8-XT2N] (archived Sept. 10, 2018).  
11. Cf.  David  Campbell  et  al.,  Introduction  to  Urbicide:  The  Killing  of  Cities?, 
10(2) T HEORY & EVENT 1, 1 (“As traditional wars between nation states conducted in 
open terrain have become objects of relative curiosity, so the informal, ‘asymmetric’ or 
‘new’ wars that centre on localized struggles over strategic urban sites have become the 
norm.”).  
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enemies.12  In  light  of  these  and  other  realities  of  modern  combat, 
situations  falling  within  the  purview  of  the  “cannot  so  distinguish” 
exception will become ever more common. 
 Thirdly, in light of remarkable advances in intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and the means to 
communicate the information attained thereby, concealment and 
deception  have  become  pervasive  features  of  modern-day  combat 
operations.13 Appearing to be a civilian, or otherwise frustrating the 
enemy’s ability to distinguish civilians from combatants, offers 
meaningful tactical advantages, both in terms of avoiding 
identification by the enemy and mounting one’s own offensive 
operations. Indeed, the tactical advantages of muddying enemy 
targeting by operating from within the civilian population have been 
tragically illustrated during recent conflicts in which insurgents have 
prevented the civilian population from fleeing cities where combat is 
expected.14 It is thus necessary to understand where the legal limits of 
such tactics lie beyond the basic prohibition of perfidy, which bans the 
feigning of civilian or other protected status in order to kill, wound, or 
capture the enemy.15 The scope of Article 44(3) is central to such limits. 
 To  lay  the  foundation  for  assessing  application  of  the  phrase 
“cannot  so  distinguish”  in  modern  warfare,  Part  II  of  the  Article 
introduces  IHL’s  extant  standards  for  combatancy.  The  piece  then 
turns  to  the  travaux  préparatoires  of  Article  44(3)  in  Part  III.  This 
analysis  exposes  the  limitations  of  relying  solely  on  the  provision’s 
drafting history to understand the notion. Therefore, and consistent 
with the interpretive approach set forth in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties,16 we look to the object and purpose of Article 44(3) 
to inform our examination in Part IV. Armed with an understanding of 
this telos of the provision, in Part V of the Article we proffer “enemy 
control  of  battlespace”  as  the  appropriate  standard  for  determining 
when  the  requirement  to  distinguish  oneself  may  exceptionally  be 
attenuated. Finally, Part VI highlights a number of legal safeguards 
that  mitigate  the  risk  associated  with  use  of  enemy  control  of  the 
                                                                                                                  
 
12. See IVAN ARREGUÍN-TOFT, HOW THE WEAK WIN WARS: A THEORY OF 
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 12–13 (2005). 
13. See SCOTT GERWEHR & RUSSELL W. GLENN, THE ART OF DARKNESS: 
DECEPTION AND URBAN OPERATIONS 37–38 (2000). 
14. See,  e.g.,  ICRC & INTERACTION, OUTCOME REPORT: WHEN WAR MOVES  TO 
CITIES: PROTECTION  OF CIVILIANS  IN URBAN AREAS 2  (2017)  [hereinafter WHEN WAR 
MOVES  TO CITIES],  https://reliefweb.int/report/world/when-war-moves-cities-protection-
civilians-urban-areas-outcome-report-may-2017  (illustrating  some  examples  of  urban 
warfare and its impact on civilians). 
15. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 37(1) (setting out the prohibition 
of perfidy and listing examples of prohibited conduct). 
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.  
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battlespace  vis-à-vis  Article  44(3)’s  reference  to  situations  in  which 
combatants “cannot so distinguish” themselves. 
 Two cautionary notes are in order, lest the analysis that follows 
be understood in an overbroad manner. First, the discussion applies 
only  to  international  armed  conflict.  This  is  because  the  concept  of 
combatancy  is  limited  to  armed  conflicts  that  are  international  in 
character; there is no equivalent to combatant status in non-
international  armed  conflicts.17  Second,  the  analysis  is  confined  to 
conflicts between states parties to AP I (and, possibly, those involving 
parties to the conflict that accept and apply the Protocol on an ad hoc 
basis18). Although a number of the Protocol’s provisions either reflect 
or have acquired the force of customary law,19 that is not the case with 
all of the instrument’s rules.20  
 In this regard, the customary status of Article 44 is nuanced. Most 
of its components are considered reflective of customary international 
law. This includes the first sentence of paragraph 3, which prescribes 
that combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population in order to enjoy the benefits of combatancy.21 In particular, 
that sentence has been recognized by the International Committee of 
the  Red  Cross  (ICRC)  as  an  expression  of  customary  international 
                                                                                                                  
 
17. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 41 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter D INSTEIN, CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES];  Knut  Ipsen,  Combatants  and  Non-Combatants,  in  THE HANDBOOK  OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  79,  85  (Dieter  Fleck  ed.,  3d  ed.  2013);  GARY D. 
SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 201 
(2d ed. 2016). 
18. Cf. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 96(2). 
19. For an early observation to this effect, see Yoram Dinstein, The Application 
of  Customary  International  Law  Concerning  Armed  Conflicts  in  the  National  Legal 
Order,  in  NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION  OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29, 34 
(Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1990) (“[I]n my assessment, the great majority of the norms 
of the Protocol—perhaps as many as 85%—qualify as declaratory or non-
controversial[.]”). 
20. See,  e.g.,  John  Bellinger  &  William  James  Haynes,  A  US  Government 
Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 89 I NT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 446 (2007) (“Additional 
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions contain far-reaching provisions, but States 
did not at the time of their adoption believe that all of those instruments’ provisions 
reflected rules that already had crystallized into customary international law; indeed, 
many provisions were considered ground-breaking and gap-filling at the time.”). 
21. See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, 
Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, PROGRAM ON 
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH: H ARVARD UNIVERSITY: O CCASIONAL 
PAPER SERIES, Winter 2005, at 64–65 (‘The first sentence of Article 44(3) of Additional 
Protocol I is essentially a statement of customary international law[.]”). But see Anthony 
Rogers,  Combatant  Status,  in  P ERSPECTIVES  ON THE ICRC STUDY  ON CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 116 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 
2007) (“Under customary law . . . if a person qualifies as a prisoner of war, he must be 
accorded prisoner-of-war status even if he has not distinguished himself from the civilian 
population.”).  
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law.22 However, this is not the case with the second sentence of the 
same paragraph, which relaxes the requirement.23 On the contrary, a 
number of nonparty states have publicly objected to the exception. 24 
Nonetheless, it remains valid law for states parties to the Protocol and 
will be examined here as such. 
II. COMBATANT STATUS: THE LEX SCRIPTA 
 The legal status of fighters engaged in hostilities is determined by 
the regulation of combatant status under IHL. As with many other IHL 
issues,  the  relevant  rules  constitute  an  attempt  to  craft  a  balance 
between military and humanitarian considerations.25 On the one hand, 
the  legal  designation  of  combatants  serves  to  allow  armed  forces 
involved in an international armed conflict to take those actions that 
are  necessary  to  bring  about  their  opponent’s  defeat  (principle  of 
military necessity). This is accomplished by affording members of the 
armed  forces  combatant  immunity  for  certain  acts  that  would  be 
unlawful but for the fact that they were undertaken during an armed 
conflict. On the other hand, by carving out a category of persons who 
alone are liable to be targeted lawfully, IHL also serves the 
countervailing goal of protecting the lives and health of those who do 
not directly participate in hostilities (principle of humanity).26 
Affording combatants the benefits of POW status once they are hors de 
combat due to surrender or capture, and thus no longer able to fight, 
also reflects the humanitarian underpinning of IHL.27 
 The interaction of these two foundational principles finds its most 
fundamental expression in the rule of distinction, today enshrined in 
                                                                                                                  
 
22. ICRC CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at 384. 
23. Cf. id. at 387–89.  
24. See,  e.g.,  DOD LAW  OF WAR MANUAL,  supra  note  5,  at  119  ¶  4.6.1.2  (“The 
United  States  has  objected  to  the  way  these  changes  relaxed  the  requirements  for 
obtaining  the  privileges  of  combatant  status,  and  did  not  ratify  AP  I,  in  large  part, 
because of them.”); Official Records, supra note 5, at 121 ¶ 17 (Israel explaining its vote 
against the draft rule on grounds that it “was contrary to the spirit and to a fundamental 
principle of humanitarian law”). 
25. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian  Law:  Preserving  the  Delicate  Balance,  50  VA. J. INT’L L.  795,  798–801 
(2010)  (“IHL  represents  a  carefully  thought  out  balance  between  the  principles  of 
military  necessity  and  humanity.  Every  one  of  its  rules  constitutes  a  dialectical 
compromise between these two opposing forces.”). 
26. See JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 61–62 (1985) (discussing the fundamental principles of 
international humanitarian law). 
27. See ICRC  CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at 166–67 (“Respect for and protection 
of persons who are in the power of an adverse party is a cornerstone of international 
humanitarian law[.]”). 
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Article  48  of  AP  I  and  generally  considered  as  reflecting  customary 
international law.28 The rule requires parties to the conflict to “at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants.” 29 
Since the definition of civilians is in the negative, that is, civilians are 
those who are not combatants,30 the meaning of the term “combatant” 
is the key to application of the rule, as well as its progeny, such as the 
prohibition on attacking civilians or intentionally terrorizing them.31  
 The  classic  definition  of  a  combatant  was  first  articulated  with 
binding  force32  in  Article  1  of  the  Regulations  annexed  to  the  1899 
Hague Convention II,33 which was subsequently incorporated verbatim 
into the first article of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention 
IV  of  1907.34  The  latter,  which  has  long  been  deemed  to  reflect 
customary international law,35 provided, 
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia 
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
                                                                                                                  
 
28. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶¶ 78–79 (July 8); Western Front, Aerial Bombardment 
and  Related  Claims:  Eritrea’s  Claims  1,  3,  5,  9–13,  14,  21,  25  &  26,  Partial  Award, 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (Dec. 19, 2005) 26 R.I.A.A. 291, ¶¶ 93–95; ICRC  
CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at rr. 1, 7.  
29. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 48. 
30. Id. art. 50(1). 
31. Id. art. 51(2). 
32. See  also  PROJECT  OF  AN INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION CONCERNING  THE 
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR (1874), reprinted in  THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 23, 24 
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) (containing the first international 
attempt  to  define  combatant  status).  However,  the  Brussels  Declaration  was  never 
ratified and thus it did not acquire the force of a binding agreement. See K UBO MAČÁK, 
INTERNATIONALIZED ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133–35 (2018) 
(discussing the relevance of the Brussels Declaration for the historical development of 
combatant status under IHL).  
33. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex 
on Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, July 29, 1899, 
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900). 
34. Regulations  Respecting  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on  Land,  Annex  to 
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct. 
18, 1907, 205 C.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
35. See, e.g., Trial of the Major War Criminals, Judgment, International Military 
Tribunal, 253–54, Sept. 30, 1946; Judgment of 4 November 1948, International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, November 4, 1948 (IMTFE), reproduced in T HE TOKYO WAR 
CRIMES TRIAL vol. 22, at 48, 291 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia M. Zaide eds., 1981).  
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In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part 
of it, they are included under the denomination “army.” 36 
 The  1949  Geneva  Conventions  adopted  these  four  conditions, 
while making the criteria for combatant status even more stringent. 
Article 4A of Geneva Convention III (GC III), which lists the categories 
of  persons  who,  if  captured  by  the  enemy,  are  to  be  accorded  POW 
status,  is  universally  considered  as  setting  forth  the  contemporary 
criteria for combatant status under customary international law. 37 It 
provides, in relevant part: 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of 
the enemy: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of 
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including 
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict 
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is 
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or 
an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
 Like  its  Hague  Conventions  counterparts,  Article  4A  of  GC  III 
distinguishes between regular and irregular armed forces. The latter 
                                                                                                                  
 
36. Hague Regulations, supra note 34, art. 1. 
37. See, e.g., C OMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1677, at 515 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 
1987) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY] (acknowledging that 
combatant status was not explicitly affirmed by Article 4A GC III, but considering it 
implicitly included in the recognition of POW status);  EMILY CRAWFORD, IDENTIFYING 
THE ENEMY: CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION  IN ARMED CONFLICT 17 (2015) (“Article  43  of 
Protocol 1 and Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention outline who is entitled to POW 
status and, by extension, combatant status.”); Sean Watts, Who Is a Prisoner of War?, in 
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 890,  ¶  2  (Andrew  Clapham,  Paola 
Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015) (noting that art. 4A GC III “has been perceived as a 
merger of sorts between conditions for POW status and conditions expected of 
combatants generally”); NOAM ZAMIR, CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE LEGAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS 136 
(2017) (considering that the original purpose of art. 4A GC III was to determine who was 
entitled to POW status and consequently to serve as a definition of a combatant). 
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are  subject  to  four  conditions  listed  in  the  second  subparagraph, 
including  that  of  having  a  “fixed  distinctive  sign,”38  a  requirement 
satisfied by wear of a uniform, and of carrying their weapons openly.39 
It is these two requirements that Article 44(3) of AP I relaxes by means 
of its “cannot so distinguish” text. 
 Experts  in  the  field  take  differing  views  on  whether  the  four 
conditions implicitly apply to members of the armed forces, including 
members of militia or volunteer corps forming part of the armed forces, 
such that their failure to comply with them would deprive the 
individuals concerned of the benefits of combatant status. Proponents 
of their implicit application, including one of the authors, find support 
in  some  case  law,  such  as  the  Privy  Council’s  1968  judgement  in 
Mohamed Ali et al. v. Public Prosecutor, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1942  Ex  Parte  Quirin  decision.40  Those  taking  the  opposite  view, 
including the other author, point to the plain wording of the provision 
and the fact that the conditions textually modify only that part of the 
Article dealing with irregular forces, as confirmed by an examination 
of the travaux of GC III.41  
 Nonetheless, this debate need not detain us, for AP I sets forth 
separate conditions for parties to a conflict in which the instrument 
applies. Article 43(2) stipulates that all members of armed forces other 
than medical or religious personnel are combatants, thereby 
dispensing  with  the  clear  distinction  between  regular  and  irregular 
                                                                                                                  
 
38. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4A(2)(b). 
39. Id. art. 4A(2)(c). 
40. See Ex parte Quirin et al., 317 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1942) (“Our Government, by 
thus  defining  lawful  belligerents  entitled  to  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war,  has 
recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents not entitled to that privilege, 
including those who though combatants do not wear ‘fixed and distinctive emblems’.”); 
Mohamed  Ali  et  al.  v.  Public  Prosecutor  (1968),  [1969]  AC  430,  449  (holding  that 
belonging to the armed forces does not suffice for an entitlement to receive prisoner of 
war status); see also, e.g., D INSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 17, at 50–51; 
Ian Brownlie, Decisions of British Courts During 1968 Involving Questions of Public or 
Private International Law, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 217, 238–39 (1969); Gerald Draper, The 
Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, 45 B RIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 173, 
182  n.1  (1971)  (“[M]embership  of  armed  forces  is  not  enough  to  establish  lawful 
combatancy, unless members operate openly in combat in such capacity[.]”); W. Thomas 
Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants under the 
International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9  CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 39, 
74 (1977) (discussing the application of the POW conditions to regular combatants). But 
see  In  re  von  Lewinski  (called  von  Manstein),  16  I.L.R.  509,  515–16  (1949)  (British 
Military Court at Hamburg) (holding that “regular soldiers” did not have to meet the 
four requirements in order to qualify as combatants). 
41. See, e.g., ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 328 (1976) 
(“[B]oth in view of the wording and the legislative history of article 4 it cannot be a priori 
concluded  that  the  four  requirements  are  constitutive  conditions  for  prisoner-of-war 
status  with  respect  to  regular  forces[.]”);  MAČÁK,  supra  note  32,  at  166–69;  W.  Hays 
Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 C HICAGO J. INT’L L. 493, 509–
10 (2003); Watts, supra note 37, at 894. 
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forces found in its predecessors.42 Pursuant to Article 44(3) (quoted in 
full above), combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population when conducting attacks or engaging in military operations 
that are preparatory to an attack. In special situations (discussed at 
greater length below), this requirement is somewhat relaxed, meaning 
in particular that the beneficiaries of the exception do not have to wear 
uniforms or other distinguishing garb or emblems. However, they must 
still carry their weapons openly while engaged in attacks and during a 
defined period before such attacks are launched. 43 Moreover, Article 
44(7) stipulates that despite the exception, Article 44 “is not intended 
to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the 
wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, 
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.”44  
 Combatants  who  are  captured  during  a  conflict  to  which  the 
Protocol  applies  forfeit  their  POW  status  if  they  fail  to  distinguish 
themselves  from  the  civilian  population  to  the  extent  required  by 
Article 44(3),45 although they are nevertheless entitled to “protections 
equivalent  in  all  respects  to  those  accorded  to  prisoners  of  war.”46 
Moreover, even though they may be dressed as civilians, and despite 
the fact that the reason they may have been so dressed is to enhance 
their survivability in the battlespace, their conduct in failing to wear 
distinctive clothing or emblems and hiding their weapons until 
deployment to an attack does not amount to perfidy.47 
                                                                                                                  
 
42. See ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1672, at 511–13 
(explaining  the  modern  dilution  of  the  preexisting  distinction  between  regular  and 
irregular forces); M ICHAEL BOTHE, KARL J. PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES 
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS 
ADDITIONAL  TO  THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS  OF 1949,  at  236–38  (1982);  HEATHER A. 
WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION 
MOVEMENTS 173–78 (1988) (outlining the nuances of distinguishing between regular and 
irregular forces). 
43. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3) (“Recognizing . . . that there 
are  situations  in  armed  conflicts  where,  owing  to  the  nature  of  hostilities  an  armed 
combatant  cannot  so  distinguish  himself,  he  shall  retain  his  status  as  a  combatant, 
provided that . . . he carries his arms openly[.]”). 
44. Id. art. 44(7). 
45. Id. art. 44(3) (noting that “he shall retain his status as a combatant” if the 
requirements of the exception are satisfied) (emphasis added).  
46. Id. art. 44(4). For more on the treatment of such individuals despite their loss 
of POW status, see ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1719, at 538; 
BOTHE ET AL., supra note 42, at 289–90. 
47. See id. art. 44(3) (“Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph 
shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1(c).”); 
see also id. art. 37(1)(c) (listing “the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status” as an 
example of perfidy). 
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III. TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
 A product of extensive negotiations during the 1974–77 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, Article 44(3) is hardly an example 
of concision and brevity. Revealingly, opinions regarding its text began 
to differ soon after it had been tentatively approved. 48 As a pars pro 
toto  example,  while  the  delegate  of  Ivory  Coast  lauded  the  future 
Article 44(3) as “crystal clear and requir[ing] no interpretation,”49 the 
Spanish representative saw it as “somewhat heterogeneous, sometimes 
contradictory, and not altogether clear.”50 
 The central question for the present purposes is the appropriate 
interpretation of the second sentence of Article 44(3) in the context of 
contemporary  warfare.  In  this  regard,  the  drafting  history  of  the 
Protocol is inconclusive. Not all of the delegations actively supported 
the provision; ultimately, there were seventy-three votes for Article 44, 
one  against,  and  twenty-one  abstentions.51  More  to  the  point,  the 
United Kingdom perceptively opined that “any failure to distinguish 
between  combatants  and  civilians  could  only  put  the  latter  at  risk. 
That risk might well become unacceptable unless a satisfactory 
interpretation could be given to [the provision].”52 The crucial 
endeavor, therefore, lay in identifying situations qualifying as ones in 
which combatants “cannot so distinguish” themselves.  
 Examination of the instrument’s travaux reveals that delegations 
that did not oppose adoption of the provision in Geneva broadly fell into 
three categories vis-à-vis its scope of application. Firstly, many 
Western states insisted that the future Article 44(3) would apply only 
in occupied territories.53 Secondly, some states considered its 
application to also extend to wars of national liberation as defined in 
Article  1(4)  of  AP  I.54  The  remaining  states  typically  praised  the 
adoption of the provision without limiting its application to any specific 
situation.55  
 Upon ratification of the Protocol, many states that had aligned 
themselves  with  one  of  the  two  more  restrictive  positions  issued 
interpretive declarations confirming their understanding of the 
                                                                                                                  
 
48. See generally Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 156–88 (providing 
countries’ explanations for voting for or against the draft article).  
49. Id. at 171 ¶ 12 (Ivory Coast). 
50. Id. at 162 ¶ 41 (Spain). 
51. Id. at 121. 
52. Id. at 132 ¶ 73 (United Kingdom). 
53. See,  e.g.,  id.  at  157  ¶  12  (United  Kingdom),  167  ¶  63  (Germany),  170  ¶  7 
(Greece), 172 ¶ 19 (France), 176 ¶ 39 (Canada), 179 ¶ 53 (United States), 186 ¶ 83 (New 
Zealand). 
54. See, e.g., id. at 159 ¶ 24 (Norway), 166 ¶ 59 (Argentina), 174 ¶ 28 (Sweden). 
55. See, e.g., id. at 159–60 ¶¶ 26–27 (Egypt), 161 ¶ 36 (Syria), 161 ¶ 39 (South 
Korea), 162 ¶ 42 (India).  
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applicative scope of the provision.56 Although there was some 
movement between the categories following the instrument’s 
adoption,57  the  three  views  continued  to  be  represented  among  the 
states parties. This implies that, at the very minimum, the provision 
applies to situations of occupation because such cases form the lowest 
common denominator on which all states parties to the Protocol seem 
to  be  in  agreement.58  For  instance,  provided  that  the  situationally 
specific conditions stipulated in Article 44(3) had been met, it would 
apply to Russian occupied territories during the international armed 
conflict in 2008 between Georgia and Russia59 as well as to the ongoing 
occupation of Crimea by Russia in its international armed conflict with 
Ukraine.60  
 However, belligerent occupation as the least common denominator 
approach deriving from analysis of the travaux cannot be considered 
conclusive with respect to the provision’s interpretation. Chiefly, this 
                                                                                                                  
 
56. For instance, Australia issued a declaration to the effect that “the situation 
described in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can exist only in occupied territory or in 
armed  conflicts  covered  by  paragraph  4  of  Article  1.”  Treaties,  States  Parties  and 
Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ 
ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=10312B4E9047086EC1
256402003FB253 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W2S8-GUM7] (archived 
Sept.  13,  2018)  [hereinafter  Australia  Declaration];  see  also  Julie  Gaudreau,  The 
Reservations to the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of 
War  Victims,  849  INT’L REV. RED CROSS  143,  152–53  (2003)  (referring  to  ten  such 
declarations or reservations).  
57. For example, the United Kingdom modified its position to the extent that “the 
situation in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can only exist in occupied territory or in 
armed conflicts covered by paragraph 4 of Article 1” (wars of national liberation). See 
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, I NT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?Open 
Document (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/82RN-G83L] (archived Sept. 12, 
2018) (emphasis added). 
58. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(2)(a) (providing that for the 
purposes of treaty interpretation, the relevant context also comprises “any agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty”). In this regard, see M ARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 
1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 430 ¶ 18 (2009) (noting that “the 
term ‘agreement’ [in Article 31(2)(a) VCLT] is clearly wider and covers any contractual 
instrument, in particular also agreements not in written form”). 
59. See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE 
CONFLICT IN GEORGIA REPORT 311 (2009) (considering that the law of occupation was 
applicable  to  certain  parts  of  Georgia  under  Russian  control);  Military  Occupation  of 
Georgia by Russia, G ENEVA ACAD. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/ 
military-occupation-of-georgia-by-russia#collapse2accord  [https://perma.cc/5S5S-9KHJ] 
(archived Nov. 3, 2018) (overview of the Georgian-Russia conflict). 
60. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2016, at ¶ 158, www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/ 
161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf  [https://perma.cc/M8L7-DTCZ]  (archived  Sept.  10,  2018) 
(considering that “the situation within the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually 
amounts to an on-going state of occupation”). 
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is because a limited consensus on the most restrictive interpretation of 
a  rule  by  the  drafters  should  not  be  confused  with  agreement  by 
adherents of more permissive interpretations to abandon their views 
in  order  to  reach  consensus.61  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  most 
restrictive interpretation appeared to be acceptable to all drafters.  
IV. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE EXCEPTION 
 With respect to the drafters’ focus on occupation, it is essential to 
point out that the travaux are preparatory works of a treaty. According 
to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
which is generally considered reflective of customary law, preparatory 
work is a “supplementary means of interpretation,” one that acquires 
valence only after the primary means of interpretation have failed to 
provide a clear and reasonable meaning of the provision in question.62 
Accordingly,  drafting  history,  while  informative  in  itself,  is  of  only 
secondary value in the interpretation of treaties.  
 By contrast, Article 31 of the VCLT sets forth the determinative 
interpretive mechanism: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”63 Any 
interpretation of Article 44(3) accordingly must consider its underlying 
“object and purpose.”64 Although the usual order in which the methods 
of interpretation provided for by the VCLT are employed begins with 
the ordinary meaning of the terms,65 there is no requirement to do so 
and it is rather understood that they “are all of equal value; none are 
of an inferior character.”66 In the present case, it is particularly helpful 
to begin with the object and purpose of the provision in question.  
 Unusually, the telos of the provision is set forth expressly in its 
opening sentence—“to promote the protection of the civilian population 
from the effects of hostilities.” 67 At first glance, it might appear that 
                                                                                                                  
 
61. But  see  Frits  Kalshoven,  The  Diplomatic  Conference  on  Reaffirmation  and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 
1974–1977, in FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED ESSAYS 
181, 202 (2007) (suggesting that at the conference “there was a marked unity of opinion 
that the situations envisaged in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can arise solely in 
occupied  territory  and  in  the  case  of  wars  of  national  liberation”)  (emphasis  added). 
Kalshoven’s  suggestion  overstates  the  point  given  that  many  delegations  did  not 
subscribe to either of the two more restrictive views. See supra sources cited in note 55. 
62. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 32. 
63. Id. art. 31(1). 
64. Id.  
65. See,  e.g.,  ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW  AND PRACTICE  187  (2007) 
(“One naturally begins with the text . . . .”). 
66. VILLIGER, supra note 58, at 435. 
67. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3). 
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this  goal  is  incongruous  with  any  relaxation  of  the  obligation  to 
distinguish oneself. In that vein, it has been argued that allowing some 
armed participants to dispense with the obligation, even for a limited 
period  of  time,  “seriously  undermine[s]  the  principle  which  is  so 
important  for  the  protection  of  the  civilian  population,  namely  the 
presumption that apparently unarmed persons in civilian clothes pose 
no threat and should not be attacked[.]” 68 This line of argumentation 
suggests that the attenuation of the principle of distinction embodied 
in  Article  44(3)  reduced  or  even  “effectively  nullif[ied]”  the  legal 
protection for civilians. 69 As Professor Geoffrey Corn has argued, the 
provision supposedly diluted  
one of the most important quid pro quos of humanitarian law: in exchange for 
making yourself more easily distinguishable from the civilian population (and as 
a  result  facilitating  the  ability  of  an  enemy  to  lawfully  attack  you),  the  law 
granted you the benefit of POW status with its accordant combatant immunity.70 
 In our view, these assertions present an incomplete picture of the 
provision  and  its  legal  effects.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
threshold for the applicability of the exception in the second sentence 
of Article 44(3) is particularly high. It requires that the only option the 
potential beneficiaries have to continue fighting, is to dispense, to a 
degree,  with  distinguishing  themselves,  in  line  with  the  ordinary 
rules.71 Therefore, the actual choice in the situations in question is not 
as  simple  as  a  legal-policy  preference  for  combatants  being  easily 
distinguishable from the civilian population or not. Instead, the crucial 
question is how to treat, as a matter of law, the consequences of the 
fact that the combatants in question are unable to distinguish 
themselves if they wish to continue fighting. In other words, the choice 
is  between  exceptionally  permitting  this  mode  of  combat  in  limited 
circumstances—and thus keeping those who engage in it within the 
bounds of the law—and labelling them as persons operating in 
violation of the requirements of IHL.  
 This being so, there is an even more fundamental quid pro quo 
lying at the core of IHL than that highlighted by Professor Corn, that 
is, the premise that by bestowing a degree of legal protection on the 
combatants in question by recognizing the military necessity in limited 
circumstances of relaxing the distinction requirement, the law 
                                                                                                                  
 
68. M.H.F. Clarke, T. Glynn & A.P.V. Rogers, Combatant and Prisoner of War 
Status, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS OF THE 1977 GENEVA 
PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION 120 (Michael A. Meyer ed., 1989). 
69. CRAWFORD, supra note 37, at 44. 
70. Geoffrey  S.  Corn,  Thinking  the  Unthinkable:  Has  the  Time  Come  to  Offer 
Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 S TAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 274 (2011). 
71. See infra text accompanying notes 86–91. 
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incentivizes them to abide by IHL generally.72 The inclusiveness of the 
law  exerts  a  powerful  pull  dynamic  that  enables  and  strengthens 
overall compliance. This was recognized by a number of delegations in 
Geneva,  as  illustrated  by  a  Norwegian  delegate  who  noted  that  the 
beneficiaries of the future Article 44(3) would thereby “be motivated to 
ensure  the  application  of  international  humanitarian  law,”73  which 
“would in turn lead to a better protection of all war victims, and in 
particular of the civilian population.” 74 As the ICRC Commentary to 
the provision explains, 
[g]uerilla  fighters  will  not  simply  disappear  by  putting  them  outside  the  law 
applicable in armed conflict, on the basis that they are incapable of complying 
with the traditional rules of such law. Neither would this encourage them to at 
least comply with those rules which they are in a position to comply with, as this 
would not benefit them in any way. 75 
 Seen from this perspective, it becomes clear why the availability 
of combatant status for persons who take advantage of Article 44(3)’s 
exception to the requirement of distinction can actually contribute to 
the protection of the civilian population. By providing these fighters 
with  legal  status  and  its  attendant  benefits,  such  as  combatant 
immunity and formal POW status, the law operates to encourage them 
to respect and protect the civilian population. 76 This is because their 
incentive to comply with the law will be reduced if their legal status 
lies  beyond  the  accepted  boundaries  of  the  law,  thus  making  them 
liable  to  prosecution  for  acts  for  which  they  would  otherwise  enjoy 
combatant immunity, such as attacking the enemy and enemy military 
objectives.  
 Faced with a choice between the Article 44(3) exception possibly 
reducing  civilian  protection  on  the  one  hand  and  de-incentivizing 
compliance with IHL in the absence of the exception on the other, a 
teleological  interpretation  of  the  provision  requires  endorsing  the 
former, even if it may at first appear counterintuitive. But the question 
remains, what interpretive standard best advances the telos of 
optimizing protection of the civilian population? 
  
                                                                                                                  
 
72. See, e.g., Howard S. Levie,  Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, 
in 59 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 46 (1978). See generally Steve Nabors, A Right to 
Fight: The Belligerent’s Privilege, in  RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE 23 
(Charles Sampford, Spencer Zifcak & Derya Aydin Okur eds., 2015). 
73. Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 158 ¶ 18. 
74. Id. (emphasis added). 
75. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1684 at 521. 
76. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 1; Geneva Convention III,  supra 
note 3, art. 1. 
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V. ENEMY CONTROL OF BATTLESPACE  
 The evolution of warfare over the four decades since the adoption 
of the Protocol, in particular the regular conduct of hostilities among 
the civilian population, requires a reassessment of the terms of Article 
44(3) in light of its object and purpose of “promot[ing] the protection of 
the civilian population from the effects of hostilities.” Armed with this 
telos, it is possible to shape a contemporary approach to the exception. 
 Which  potential  understandings  are  legally  viable  falls  to  be 
determined by reference to the aforementioned canons of 
interpretation. As noted, the interpretive process starts with an 
examination of the specific text of the relevant terms of the treaty in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning. 77 A possible initial obstacle in 
this regard is the text at the beginning of Article 44(3)’s sentence in 
question—“Recognizing . . . that there are situations in armed 
conflicts.”78 It could be objected that the word “recognizing” indicates 
that the normative content of the following text is limited to situations 
that pre-existed the adoption of the provision, and thus were within 
the contemplation of the drafters.  
 However,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  such  an  objection  with  the 
prevailing  evolutive  approach  to  the  interpretation  of  AP  I.  The 
approach  was  reflected  in  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)’s 
modern construction of the so-called Martens Clause, which is 
enshrined in Article 1 of the Protocol, 79 when the ICJ addressed “the 
rapid evolution of military technology.”80 Similarly, in the context of a 
well-known debate over whether computer data qualifies as a military 
objective under Article 52(2) of AP I, both sides notably accepted that 
the provision is subject to dynamic interpretation, even though they 
differed on the conclusion to which such interpretation led.81  
 The ICJ also employed the evolutive approach in its Navigational 
Rights judgment. There, the court noted: 
                                                                                                                  
 
77. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(1). 
78. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3) (emphasis added). 
79. See id. art. 1(2) (“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other 
international  agreements,  civilians  and  combatants  remain  under  the  protection  and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from 
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”). The clause was 
first set forth in the 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 33, pmbl., and later replicated 
in the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 34, pmbl. 
80. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 ¶ 78 (July 8). 
81. Compare  Kubo  Mačák,  Military  Objectives  2.0:  The  Case  for  Interpreting 
Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law, 48 I SR. L. REV. 55, 
70–71 (2015), with Michael N. Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects’ During Cyber Operations: 
A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 I SR. L. REV. 81, 94–95 
(2015). 
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where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily 
having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, 
and  where  the  treaty  has  been  entered  into  for  a  very  long  period  or  is  “of 
continuing duration”, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have 
intended those terms to have an evolving meaning.  82 
 
 Self-evidently, AP I is a treaty of indeterminate duration and the 
key terms in Article 44(3) (“situations,” “nature of the hostilities,” and 
“military deployment”) are of a generic nature. By the court’s approach, 
therefore, it is apposite to read the provision in a manner that permits 
its adaptation to contemporary conflict. 83 It cannot be otherwise, for 
law must remain responsive to the realities of combat in order to serve 
its function of balancing military necessity and humanitarian 
concerns. 
 Since the phrase “situations in armed conflicts” is adaptive to the 
context in which it is to be applied, the challenge is to identify those 
situations in modern warfare (in addition to situations of belligerent 
occupation discussed above) that may qualify as ones in which, “owing 
to  the  nature  of  the  hostilities,”  combatants  “cannot”  distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.84 A well-known contemporary 
critic of the Additional Protocol decried the modal verb “cannot” as “a 
masterstroke  of  amoral  draftsmanship.”85  Beyond  such  unfortunate 
hyperbole, though, how is the notion best understood in 2018 in the 
context of protecting the civilian population from the effects of 
hostilities? 
 To  begin  with,  the  exemption  in  the  second  sentence  of  Article 
44(3)  only  applies  in  special  situations,  and  not,  for  example,  to 
irregular armed forces in general.86 After all, “cannot” implies that the 
individuals in question have no other means of effectively continuing 
to  fight  than  dispensing  with  the  requirement  to  wear  a  uniform, 
                                                                                                                  
 
82. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, 243 ¶ 66 (July 13).  
83. Cf. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of 
Israel,  62(1)  PD  507,  ¶  28  (2006)  (Isr.),  reprinted  in  46  INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 373 
(“[N]ew  reality  at  times  requires  new  interpretation.  Rules  developed  against  the 
background of a reality which has changed must take on a dynamic interpretation which 
adapts them, in the framework of accepted interpretational rules, to the new reality.”). 
84. It must be cautioned that the reference to “situations” in Article 44(3) denotes 
specific engagements as distinct from the entire conflict or campaign. Each engagement 
must  be  judged  on  its  own  merits  to  determine  whether  the  circumstances  merit 
application of the relaxed level of distinction provided for in the Article. 
85. Douglas  J.  Feith,  Law  in  the  Service  of  Terror—The  Strange  Case  of  the 
Additional Protocol, 1 N AT’L INT. 36, 47 (1985). 
86. See Kalshoven, supra note 61, at 201. On the distinction between regular and 
irregular forces, see supra Part II. 
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distinctive  sign,  or  other  indicia  that  they  are  combatants.  As  the 
United  Kingdom’s  Manual  on  the  Law  of  Armed  Conflict  observes, 
“[t]he special rule is thus limited to those exceptional situations where 
a combatant is truly unable to operate effectively whilst distinguishing 
himself in accordance with the normal requirements.”87  
 Accordingly, the fact that the weaker party could gain a military 
advantage by being temporarily relieved of the duty of distinction does 
not  satisfy  Article  44(3)’s  “cannot”  condition  precedent.  Similarly,  it 
does  not  suffice  that  relaxation  of  the  duty  would  help  balance  any 
operational inequities between the parties to the conflict. Both of these 
interpretations would strip the relief in the second sentence of Article 
44(3) of its exceptional character; the exception would swallow the rule 
during  the  asymmetrical  conflicts  that  have  become  so  prevalent. 
Indeed, taken to its logical extreme, if the issue was advantaging a 
party to the conflict, the exception would apply in virtually all conflicts 
because it would always afford the combatants to which it applied an 
operational benefit of some sort. Relaxation of the distinction 
requirement  to  such  a  degree  would  manifestly  run  counter  to  the 
object and purpose of the provision. 
 Therefore, the test must be much stricter. In that regard, we agree 
with the ICRC’s commentary to Article 44(3), which emphasizes that 
in order for the exception to apply, the balance of power must be “out 
of  all  proportion  in  favour  of  one  of  the  Parties.” 88  Such  radical 
imbalance means that the weaker party’s combatants cannot 
distinguish  themselves  while  still  retaining  “a  chance  of  success.”89 
Qualifying situations are those in which the asymmetrically 
disadvantaged belligerent has no remaining alternative but to resort 
to  conduct  that  would  otherwise  fail  to  comply  with  the  duty  of 
distinction.90 In other words, the exception demands that “the visible 
carrying  of  arms  and  distinguishing  signs  .  .  .  [must]  really  be 
incompatible with the practicalities of the action (for example, if the 
guerrilla fighters use the population for support or are intermingled 
with  it).”91  To  comply  with  the  requirement  of  distinction  in  the 
situations envisaged would ensure mission failure.  
 This narrow construction explains why many delegations sought 
to limit application of the provision either to wars of national liberation 
or to occupied territories, for in such situations one party to the conflict 
usually not only exercises far greater control over the area in question, 
                                                                                                                  
 
87. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 42 
¶ 4.5.1 (2004) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter UK  MANUAL]. 
88. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1702 at 532 n.50. 
89. Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 453 ¶ 19 (Report of Committee III). 
90. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1702 at 532. 
91. Id.  at  530  n.40  (citing  Charles  Chaumont,  La  recherche  d’un  critère  pour 
l’intégration de la guérilla au droit international humanitaire contemporain, in 
MÉLANGES OFFERTS À CHARLES ROUSSEAU 50 (1974)). 
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but also typically enjoys superiority in terms of military capability. The 
opposing side has little prospect of prevailing absent some relaxation 
of the requirement to distinguish oneself from the civilian population. 
However, these two situations fall short of optimizing the Article 44(3) 
exception’s goal of enhancing protection of the civilian population. 
 It may be the case that occupation reflects a high level of control 
over territory such that enemy combatants cannot realistically 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Indeed, occupying 
powers  often  issue  strict  security  measures  that  can  dramatically 
hinder the ability of enemy fighters to engage in military activities if 
they are readily identifiable as such. For instance, during the 
occupation of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority “de-ba’athified” 
Iraqi  society,92  issued  orders  governing  the  possession  of  weapons93 
and  public  gatherings  to  which  criminal  penalties  attached,94  and 
created a new Iraqi Army under its control.95 These and other actions 
of  the  occupying  forces  severely  limited  the  military  practicality  of 
insurgent fighters, including the remnants of the former Iraqi Army, 
complying with the requirement of distinction. 
 However, the legal test for occupation does not suffice as 
normative shorthand for the requisite extent of control that is 
necessary for application of the Article 44(3) exception. The applicable 
customary law definition of occupation was set forth in treaty form in 
Article  42  of  the  1907  Hague  Regulations:  “Territory  is  considered 
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile 
army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.”96  
 This standard is the subject of some debate, thereby rendering it 
unsuitable to play such an interpretive role. Certain experts are of the 
view  that  occupation  does  not  necessarily  entail  that  the  occupying 
power  is  actually  exercising  its  authority  over  the  entirety  of  the 
occupied  territory.  Rather,  it  suffices  for  that  power  to  have  the 
                                                                                                                  
 
92. COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER NO. 1: DE-BA’ATHIFICATION OF IRAQI 
SOCIETY (2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB418/docs/9a%20-%20 
Coalition%20Provisional%20Authority%20Order%20No%201%20-%205-16-03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MJ3P-6CUG] (archived Nov. 3, 2018) 
93. COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER NO. 3 (REVISED) (AMENDED): WEAPONS 
CONTROL (2003), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20031231_ 
CPAORD3_REV__AMD_.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV27-YLBB] (archived Sept. 1, 2018). 
94. COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER NO. 19: FREEDOM  OF ASSEMBLY  (2003), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030710_CPAORD_19_Freedom_ 
of_Assembly_.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5H6-D8S3] (archived Sept. 10, 2018). 
95. COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER NO. 22: CREATION OF A NEW IRAQI ARMY, 
(2003), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_ 
Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ARZ8-RHAX]  (archived  Sept.  1, 
2018). 
96. Hague Regulations, supra note 34, art. 42. 
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capacity to exert authority over the territory.97 An example would be a 
situation in which forces are moving quickly through enemy territory 
as the enemy is in full retreat. The former could leave troops in place 
to establish sufficient control over areas from which they have 
vanquished the enemy, thereby substituting their authority for that of 
the enemy government. However, because doing so would slow the pace 
of the advance, the decision is made to defer establishing that authority 
in order to press the offensive with all available assets. This was the 
case for a short period as Coalition forces raced north into Iraq in early 
2013. By the aforementioned view as to when occupation commences, 
it  is  conceivable  that  certain  territory  could  be  considered  legally 
occupied,  and  yet  the  level  of  control  over  the  area  wielded  by  the 
offensive  force  would  not  be  at  a  level  triggering  the  Article  44(3) 
exception. 
 Other scholars, relying on the ICJ’s judgement in Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo, are of the view that the actual exercise of 
authority in substitution of the enemy’s is necessary before occupation 
ensues as a matter of law.98 Consider a scenario in which the forces of 
a  party  to  the  conflict  are  in  military  control  of  an  area  to  such  an 
extent that the enemy cannot effectively operate in the open. However, 
the military forces do not supplant the authority of the local regime, 
for instance, by engaging in law enforcement, overseeing operation of 
the  judicial  system,  performing  civil  administrative  duties,  and  the 
like. In such a case, the area would not be considered occupied in the 
legal  sense  by  those  taking  this  position,  but  the  situation  would 
nevertheless meet the requirements for application of Article 44(3)’s 
exception.  
 As noted, some of the Diplomatic Conference delegations included 
wars of national liberation, defined in Article 1(4) of AP I, as situations 
giving rise to the requisite control implied in Article 44(3). 99 In our 
view,  such  a  standard  would  be  overbroad,  for  in  a  war  of  national 
liberation  the  force  fighting  the  government  may  have  the  military 
wherewithal necessary to engage in classic operations; indeed, it may 
control significant territory itself. Further, there is nothing inherent in 
a  war  of  liberation,  which  is  defined  by  reference  to  the  motive  for 
                                                                                                                  
 
97. See  INT’L COMM.  OF  THE RED CROSS,  COMMENTARY  ON  THE FIRST GENEVA 
CONVENTION, ¶ 302, at 108 (2016) (“[T]here cannot be occupation of a territory without 
effective control exercised over it by hostile foreign forces. However, effective control does 
not require the exercise of full authority over the territory; instead, the mere capacity to 
exercise such authority would suffice.”). 
98. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 116, ¶ 173 (Dec. 19). 
99. See generally Official Records, supra note 5, Vol. XV at 159 ¶ 24, 166 ¶ 59, 
174 ¶ 28 (setting forth the respective positions of Norway, Argentina, and Sweden); see 
also supra text accompanying note 54.  
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resorting  to  armed  force  against  the  government,  that  necessarily 
implies the type of control that infuses the Article 44(3) exception. 
 As a practical matter, encompassing wars of national liberation 
within  the  purview  of  the  exception  would  in  any  event  have  little 
practical  effect.  Article  1(4)  has  a  very  limited  scope  of  application, 
which has led to suggestions that it would “never be applied” and that 
it amounted to “a dead letter.” 100 Yet, the concept has recently seen 
some limited revival. In 2015, Switzerland, as the depositary of AP I, 
accepted  an  undertaking  to  apply  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  the 
Protocol that had been issued by the Polisario Front in the context of a 
purported  Article  1(4)-type  conflict  in  Western  Sahara.101  Although 
this  decision  was  challenged  by  the  government  of  Morocco  as  the 
supposed  other  party  to  the  conflict,102  the  events  surrounding  the 
declaration have arguably breathed new life into Article 1(4).103 
Nevertheless, situations qualifying as “wars of national liberation” in 
the sense of Article 1(4) are extremely rare and likely to remain so. 
 In our view, the best interpretive understanding of the exception, 
especially in the context of the prevalence of war among the civilian 
population, is that it applies only in “enemy-controlled battlespace.” 
The  phrase  denotes  a  degree  of  control  that  precludes  an  opponent 
force operating in that battlespace from distinguishing itself except as 
provided for in Article 44(3), at least with any meaningful chance of 
tactical success. Control must rise to the level of physical control by the 
military or other security forces over a relatively well-defined area.  
 These situations are necessarily characterized by a high degree of 
asymmetry between the parties to the conflict. For example, one party 
may  exercise  control  over  an  urban  environment,  while  the  other 
attempts to disrupt and subvert that control. The fact that an armed 
force or other fighters may still operate in the area does not necessarily 
deprive the situation of the degree of control necessary to qualify as 
being under enemy control. But they must not be able to do so openly 
                                                                                                                  
 
100. George  H.  Aldrich,  Prospects  for  United  States  Ratification  of  Additional 
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101. See Switzerland, Fed. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs, Notification to the Governments 
of the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of 
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103. See Kubo Mačák, Wars of national liberation: The story of one unusual rule 
II,  OUP BLOG  (July  30,  2018),  https://blog.oup.com/2018/07/wars-national-liberation-
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and cannot meaningfully be able to contest control over the area in 
question absent application of the Article 44(3) exception. Should no 
party  exert  the  requisite  control  over  the  battlespace,  the  exception 
would not apply.104 
 In  our  estimation,  the  notion  of  enemy-controlled  battlespace 
more closely approximates the object and purpose of Article 44(3) than 
the  unsettled  legal  standard  of  occupation  or  the  rare  conflict  that 
amounts to a war of national liberation. These two situations may be 
characterized  by  the  requisite  level  of  control  and  thus  qualify  as 
enemy-controlled,  but  satisfaction  of  their  legal  criteria  is  neither 
necessary, nor necessarily adequate, for application of the Article 44(3) 
exception. Therefore, the enemy-controlled battlespace standard better 
withstands testing against the teleological underpinning of the 
provision,  for  it  limits  the  exception  to  application  in  only  those 
situations in which such an exception is truly necessary.  
VI. LEGAL SAFEGUARDS 
 The goal of protecting the civilian population militates for great 
care in applying the standard of enemy control of the battlespace to the 
requirement  of  distinction’s  Article  44(3)  exception.  If  abused,  the 
standard  could  endanger  the  civilian  population  by  denying  it  the 
protection  typically  attendant  to  distinction.  Lest  this  concern  be 
exaggerated, it is important to highlight a number of safeguards that 
have  been  built  into  the  provision  itself  or  can  be  implied  from  the 
applicable law. They collectively serve to constrain potential 
detrimental effects of applying the provision in modern warfare. 
 First  and  foremost,  the  beneficiaries  of  the  exception  are  not 
entirely relieved of the requirement of distinction. In order not to lose 
combatant status, they still must carry their arms openly during the 
military engagement and “[d]uring such time as [they are] visible to 
the  adversary  while  [they  are]  engaged  in  a  military  deployment 
preceding the launching of an attack in which [they are] to 
participate.”105  
 While the concept of “military engagement” poses little 
difficulty,106 the notion of “military deployment” as used in this context 
                                                                                                                  
 
104. A  complex  situation  is  that  in  which  there  are  more  than  two  adversarial 
parties  operating  in  the  same  area.  Application  of  the  Article  44(3)  exception  would 
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openly during the battle itself, whether it is of an offensive of defensive nature”). 
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is less clear. 107 During the Diplomatic Conference, some delegations 
considered that the latter term applies to the entirety of the tactical 
movement from a hideaway to the point of attack. 108 Others argued 
that the concept of military deployment is limited to “the last step in 
the immediate and direct preparation for an attack,” in other words, 
the moment of taking up one’s firing position.109 In our view, this latter 
position is untenable, for it would negate entirely the goal of protecting 
the civilian population. If the law permitted the complete concealment 
of an attacker until the very moment of attack, the presumption that 
animates this part of the law—that “apparently unarmed persons in 
civilian dress do not attack” 110—would be eliminated. Thus, only the 
former interpretation of the term military deployment is compatible 
with the object and purpose of the exception. 
 However, the phrasing limits the requirement to carry one’s arms 
openly to such time as the combatants are visible to the adversary. In 
the spirit of compromise that animates the text of this provision, this 
aspect benefits the asymmetrically disadvantaged party. At the time 
of drafting, it was suggested that it includes situations in which the 
individuals concerned are potentially visible by technological means 
such as binoculars and infrared equipment. 111 Even viewed from the 
perspective of 1970s technology, that position appears problematic, as 
it  makes  the  requirement  dependent  upon  the  adversary’s  level  of 
technological sophistication, with obvious negative implications for the 
principle of equal application of the law.112  
 From the perspective of contemporary warfare, such an 
interpretation is even less defensible. With modern advances in 
technology, the asymmetrically more powerful party that is in physical 
control  of  the  battlespace  normally  possesses  technological  methods 
and  means  of  warfare  that  render  much  of  the  battlespace  highly 
transparent. Drones with advanced sensor suites and extended loiter 
capability, high resolution reconnaissance and surveillance satellites, 
airborne communications intercept capabilities, and cyber espionage 
come  to  mind.  In  the  urban  environment,  CCTV  cameras  have  the 
                                                                                                                  
 
107. See, e.g., B OTHE ET AL ., supra note 42, at 288 (“The term ‘deployment’ has 
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potential to passively surveil nearly every city street. To interpret the 
condition of visibility as including all these means would render the 
limitation meaningless because members of the asymmetrically 
weaker force would have to assume they are constantly visible by the 
adversary, and they therefore would have to carry their arms openly at 
all times.  
 The more defensible interpretation is that the condition should be 
understood as entailing a subjective standard; if combatants know or 
should reasonably know that they are being actively observed by the 
enemy,  then  the  duty  to  carry  their  arms  openly  activates.113  This 
certainly  includes  observation  by  the  naked  eye.  It  may  also  cover 
active forms of observation using modern technology, albeit only to the 
extent that the combatants may reasonably infer, with the information 
available to them at the time, that they are presently visible to the 
enemy, which is, at the same time, engaged in active observation. If 
they do not know or should not reasonably conclude that is the case, 
the obligation does not attach. Although this interpretation serves to 
limit the period during which the obligation activates, its import is to 
foster distinction during that time in which it will have its greatest 
protective effect for the civilian population. 
 Secondly,  the  exception  does  not  allow  for  a  “revolving  door” 
phenomenon, whereby persons are only targetable while carrying their 
arms  openly  in  line  with  the  requirements  of  the  provision,  but 
considered civilians immune from attack at all other times.114 In fact, 
the opposite is true. The requirements of Article 44(3) do not bear upon 
whether one is a combatant or not; they merely determine whether or 
not that person has committed a breach of IHL by failing to distinguish 
themselves.115  The  beneficiaries  of  the  rule  thus  remain  targetable 
irrespective  of  the  exceptional  applicability  of  Article  44(3)  at  any 
particular time.  
 Admittedly,  if  a  group  of  such  persons  are  collocated  with  the 
civilian  population,  as  would  be  the  case  in  an  urban  environment, 
their  presence  represents  a  substantial  risk  of  collateral  civilian 
casualties.116  Still,  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  targeting  these 
individuals, the adversary must abide by the other applicable rules, 
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including  the  prohibition  of  indiscriminate  attacks, 117  the  rule  of 
proportionality,118  the  duty  to  exercise  constant  care  to  spare  the 
civilian population,119 and the requirement to take all feasible 
precautions in attack to minimize incidental civilian injury or death 
and damage to civilian property.120 
 Thirdly, the same is true with respect to the beneficiaries of the 
Article 44(3) exception. The provision does not relieve them of their 
duty  to  comply  with  all  other  applicable  obligations  under  IHL.  In 
particular,  when  conducting  military  operations,  they  still  have  to 
respect the principle of distinction, and thus only direct their 
operations against military objectives.121 Additionally, they are 
equally subject to the general obligation to take “constant care . . . to 
spare  the  civilian  population,  civilians  and  civilian  objects”  in  their 
military operations,122 as well as to the specific obligation to endeavor, 
to  the  maximum  extent  feasible,  “to  remove  the  civilian  population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the 
vicinity of military objectives.”123  
 Consequently, such individuals remain obliged to avoid any 
unnecessary harm to civilians even while operating pursuant to the 
exception. This includes harm that could foreseeably be caused by their 
enemy in response to the nature of the operation undertaken by the 
combatants acting under the exception to the requirement of 
distinction.  If,  for  instance,  it  is  reasonably  foreseeable  that  the 
enemy’s  reaction  to  an  ambush  in  a  densely  populated  area  like  an 
open-air market would risk extensive loss of civilian life, the 
precautionary  rules  might  require  refraining  from  the  attack  and 
waiting for another opportunity to act.124  
 Fourthly, the effect of the provision is limited to a single kind of 
deception in armed conflict, namely the pretense of being an unarmed 
civilian in highly asymmetrical situations. For this reason, the closing 
sentence of Article 44(3) clarifies that conduct in accordance with the 
requirements prescribed by that provision shall not be considered as 
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perfidious within the meaning of Article 37(1)(c) of AP I. 125 However, 
all other acts designed to mislead the adversary by feigning protection 
under IHL, and then betraying any resulting confidence, would still be 
perfidious and, if they result in the killing, injuring, or capturing of the 
adversary, would qualify as a violation of the prohibition of perfidy.126 
Consider,  for  example,  a  situation  of  armed  violence  in  the  urban 
environment  with  the  presence  of  UN  relief  agencies.  Even  if  the 
conditions  for  the  applicability  of  Article  44(3)  AP  I  are  met,  the 
asymmetrically  disadvantaged  party  would  still  be  prohibited  from 
using the distinctive UN emblems in attacking its opponents. 127 Such 
conduct  would  qualify  as  perfidy128  and  might  amount  to  a  grave 
breach of the Protocol.129 
 Finally, even if combatants meet the requirements of Article 44(3), 
this only means they retain their combatant status. They nevertheless 
remain liable for prosecution for war crimes. As reflected in Article 85 
of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, the question of prosecution 
for such conduct is separate from the determination of combatant or 
prisoner of war status.130 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The  contemporary  propensity  for,  and  risk  of,  armed  conflict 
taking place among the civilian population has cast a new light on a 
number  of  the  long-standing  challenges  to  the  application  of  IHL 
during modern warfare. One is the determination of combatant status. 
This  Article  explored  the  possibility  of  reviving  AP  I’s  oft-reviled 
Article 44(3) by adopting an interpretation thereof that better comports 
with the object and purpose of the provision than those previously in 
vogue.  
 Our view is that it is inapposite to conflate the applicability of this 
provision with other self-standing legal tests found in IHL. In 
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particular, and although it is possible that the exceptional 
circumstances to which the Article 44(3) exception applies arise in such 
situations (as some states participating in the Diplomatic Conference 
concluded), the legal tests for the existence of occupation or of a war of 
national liberation do not suffice for determining the applicability of 
Article  44(3).  It  is  possible,  for  instance,  to  have  a  situation  during 
occupation or a war of national liberation to which the provision does 
not apply, while it is equally conceivable that the provision would apply 
in scenarios other than these two. 
 Accordingly, we suggest that the appropriate test is one of actual 
control over battlespace. If the enemy maintains a degree of control 
over the physical battlespace that renders a combatant “truly unable 
to operate effectively whilst distinguishing himself in accordance with 
the  normal  requirements,”  then  the  provision  applies.131  This  will 
often,  although  by  no  means  always,  be  the  case  during  hostilities 
occurring  in  the  proximity  of  the  civilian  population,  such  as  urban 
combat,  and  that  are  characterized  by  asymmetrical  distribution  of 
power, resources, and physical control between the parties. 
 In such limited circumstances, the provision—widely considered 
either obsolete or subsiding into irrelevance—may obtain a fresh lease 
of life. However, it bears recalling that as a non-customary provision of 
AP  I,  it  would  only  apply  to  international  armed  conflicts  involving 
states  parties  to  the  instrument.  Still,  with  over  170  states  having 
ratified  the  Protocol  so  far,  and  with  combat  occurring  among  the 
civilian  population  with  appalling  frequency,  its  relevance  will  only 
increase in the near future. And since nonparties to AP I, notably the 
United States, now regularly fight in coalitions with states that are 
party  thereto,  commanders  and  other  representatives  of  the  former 
must take into account the manner in which their coalition partners 
are likely to operate.  
 Finally,  we  caution  that  the  applicability  of  the  exception  in 
Article  44(3)  does  not  amount  to  a  “get  out  of  jail  free”  card  for  its 
beneficiaries. Far from it, the compromise between military necessity 
and humanitarian considerations that lies at the heart of the provision 
entails  a  number  of  important  safeguards  intended  to  promote  the 
protection of the civilian population in situations to which the 
exception applies. In this regard, it is incumbent on all parties to the 
conflict—the  asymmetrically  weaker  as  well  as  the  asymmetrically 
more powerful—to understand that, in the words of Jean de Preaux, 
“by protecting the civilian population they protect themselves.”132 
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